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Abstract 
I use microdata from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe to study whether the cost of acquiring health 
information is an important determinant of the decision to buy private hospital health insurance for individuals aged 50+, in 
eight European countries. I first test whether, conditional on health insurance companies' risk assessments, individuals have 
residual private information on insurance determinants other than their risk type. My results show that there are individual 
characteristics, not observed by the insurers, that are positively correlated with hospital insurance coverage and negatively 
correlated with the ex post probability of requiring hospital treatment. However, this opposite association is significantly 
different from zero only in countries with low quality healthcare systems. I then provide evidence that education and cognitive 
ability act as substitutes for quality of health promotion in determining the propensity to take out a voluntary private hospital 
insurance. 
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 1 Introduction
In most European countries the government is the main provider and source of fund-
ing for healthcare. However, a variety of macroeconomic factors (especially ageing
population and budget constraints) are causing dramatic reduction in public health-
care bene￿ts, starting from the late 1980s. As a consequence, in many countries
there has been a dramatic increase in the share of out-of-pocket health expenditure.
Voluntary private health insurance coverage in Europe is signi￿cantly higher in those
countries where, according to objective measures and individual opinions, the quality
of the healthcare system is better. There is no good explanation for this cross country
variation. I use individual data from the ￿rst two waves of the Survey of Health, Age-
ing and Retirement (SHARE) to study whether and to what extent access to health
information can explain private hospital insurance coverage among individuals aged
50-75 across eight European countries.1
European country governments have tried to boost the take up of voluntary pri-
vate health insurance (VPHI) to complement or supplement public healthcare, by
introducing tax incentives. However, the evidence suggests that the e￿ect has been
negligible.2 Private insurance coverage in Europe on average is low and varies dra-
matically across countries. As shown by the top panel in Figure 1, the proportion of
individuals aged 50+ who have taken out a complementary/supplementary private
insurance to cover hospital treatments is higher in those countries with better health-
care quality, as measured by the density of hospital beds per 1,000 inhabitants. On
the other hand, there is a negative association between the out-of-pocket expendi-
ture of the elderly and the number of hospital beds (see bottom panel of Figure 1).3
While in principle, the low uptake of private insurance in countries with poor qual-
ity healthcare systems might be explained by the fact that the private health sector
1The SHARE data collection has been primarily funded by the European Commission through
the 5th framework program (project QLK6-CT-2001-00360 in the thematic program Quality of
Life). Additional funding came from the US National Institute on Ageing (U01 AG09740-13S2, P01
AG005842, P01 AG08291, P30 AG12815, Y1-AG-4553-01 and OGHA 04-064). Data collection in
Austria (through the Austrian Science Foundation, FWF), Belgium (through the Belgian Science
Policy Administration) and Switzerland (through BBW/OFES/UFES) was nationally funded. The
SHARE data set is presented in B￿rsch-Supan et al. (2005).
2See Emmerson et al. (2001) for the UK and Rodriguez and Stoyanova (2008) for Spain.
3These correlations are robust to alternative measures of healthcare quality, i.e. number of
General Practitioners (GPs) per 1,000 inhabitants.
1does not represent a valid alternative to the public one,4 there is still a question over
why in countries with low quality healthcare, individuals prefer to cover healthcare
costs with out-of-pocket expenditure rather than taking out voluntary private health
insurance.
The main problem in cross country studies lies in the di￿culty of (de￿ning and)
observing the "price" of insurance coverage. The correlation between healthcare qual-
ity and insurance take up might potentially hide di￿erences in insurance premiums
and policy bene￿ts, as insurance markets might work better in some countries than
others.5 However, as Figure 2 shows, the positive correlation between private health
insurance coverage and healthcare quality holds across regions after controlling for
country ￿xed e￿ects.6 As average policy loadings are likely to be relatively uniform
within the same country, the last piece of evidence supports the hypothesis that di￿er-
ences in the "supply side" of insurance markets account only partially for the positive
correlation between healthcare quality and insurance coverage.
The aim of this study is to show that the individual ability to acquire information
about health related issues (broadly de￿ned as factors that can a￿ect the health risk
and/or institutional features of the healthcare system) can be an important deter-
minant of demand for private health insurance. Traditionally, physicians and health
professionals have been the primary source of information for consumers in Euro-
pean countries. Results from Eurobarometer 2003 suggest that the majority (45.3%)
of European citizens use "formal channels" (i.e. pharmacists, doctors, chemists) as
sources of health information. Thus, the quality of healthcare professionals will a￿ect
the quality of the information individuals have on health.
In the classic adverse selection models (Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and Wil-
son (1977)) potential insurance buyers are assumed to have one-dimensional private
information regarding their risk type. These models predict a positive correlation
between insurance coverage and ex post realization of loss.7 The positive correlation
4Propper et al. (2001) ￿nd that demand for private health insurance in the UK is negatively
correlated to the quality of the public health sector and positively correlated to the quality of the
private health sector.
5Mossialos and Thomson (2004) provide some descriptive evidence that across EU countries there
is no systematic relation between voluntary private health insurance coverage and measures of market
imperfections, such as concentration rate, loss ratios and share of administrative costs.
6Regions are de￿ned using the EUROSTAT NUTS2 classi￿cation and comprises regions whose
average population is 800,000-3,000,000 inhabitants.
7Chiappori et al. (2006) generalizes this empirical prediction to a larger class of models.
2property has been tested in several recent studies producing results that are mixed
and di￿er by markets.8 Some recent studies provide evidence that violation of the
positive correlation property might be due to the presence of multiple dimensions of
private information. Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) studying the long term care
(LTC) insurance market in the US ￿nd that individuals who are more risk averse
are more likely to own LTC insurance and less likely to enter a nursing home. This
result is consistent with the presence of multidimensional private information and
advantageous selection based on risk aversion.9 Fang et al. (2008) provide evidence
that there is a strong advantageous selection in the Medigap insurance market and
cognitive ability is an important source. In this work I provide evidence that the role
of education and cognitive ability, as sources of private information in the decision to
buy private hospital insurance in European countries, can be partially explained by
the cost of acquiring health information.
I focus on the take up of private hospital insurance - de￿ned as the coverage
that gives individuals an extended choice of hospitals (and clinics) for hospital care,
and/or full cover for the costs of hospital care - for three reasons. First, hospital
care is the major component of healthcare expenditure in Europe (around 40%) and
hospital insurance is by far the most common type of private health insurance among
the individuals in my sample: coverage rate is 17% as opposed to 5% coverage for
insurances that allows extended choice of doctors and specialists, and less than 1%
coverage for long term care in either a nursing home or the individual’s own home.
Second, since the current version of the SHARE data comprises only two waves col-
lected at two years apart, the probability of staying overnight in hospital in the two
years after purchase of insurance is the only meaningful measure of risk occurrence
that can be constructed. Finally, since the introduction of the third non-life insur-
ance directive in 1992, there has been an increasing harmonization of the rules that
regulate health insurance markets in EU countries. The theoretical ￿ndings in Chiap-
pori et al. (2006) suggest that, in order for multidimensional private information to
manifest itself as a violation of the positive correlation property, insurance companies
should not be free to o￿er any insurance contract they choose. The standardization
8Chiappori and Salanie (2001) perform the positive correlation test for the car insurance market
in France. Chiappori (2000) provides an extensive survey of the theoretical and empirical literature.
See Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000) for a review of the applications in the health insurance market.
9Cutler et al. (2008) provide evidence on the role of risk aversion in other insurance markets.
3of hospital insurance contracts in countries studied makes this market suitable for
investigating the presence of multidimensional private information.
In order to test whether individuals who live in areas with better healthcare ser-
vices demand more private hospital insurance because they are better informed, I
￿rst test whether, conditional on the insurance company’s own assessment of an indi-
vidual’s risk type, there is a positive correlation between hospital insurance and the
ex post probability of spending at least one night in hospital. I ￿nd no support for
this in countries with high or low healthcare quality. Second, following the approach
￿rst proposed by Finkelstein and McGarry (2006), I use subjective assessment of the
survival probability to show whether individuals have residual private information
with respect to that collected by the insurer. My ￿ndings suggest that self-reported
survival probability is positively correlated with insurance take up and negatively
correlated with ex post risk. However, these opposing correlations are signi￿cantly
di￿erent from zero only for individuals resident in countries with low quality health-
care. Finally, in order to test whether this asymmetric evidence can be explained by
the di￿erential costs of access to health information, I study whether the e￿ect of
education and cognitive ability on the decision to purchase private hospital insurance
varies with the quality of health promotion.
My results show that years of education, extent of recall and verbal ￿uency are
positively and signi￿cantly correlated with insurance coverage only in the sample of
low quality healthcare countries. When I exploit within country variations I ￿nd that
years of education and cognitive ability act as substitutes for proxies for quality of
health promotion at regional level. On average one standard deviation increase in the
scores for recall ability tests is associated with an increase of 1.6 percentage points
in the probability of signing private hospital insurance. However, the e￿ect is 1.2
percentage points higher in regions with low quality health care compared to those
with high quality care.
To my knowledge, this is the ￿rst study that tests for asymmetric information at
cross country level. This study provides two main contributions. First, it contributes
to the literature on the di￿erent dimensions of individuals’ unobservable characteris-
tics which a￿ect the decision to purchase a health insurance. Second, this analysis has
important policy implications for the organization of healthcare systems. While tax
incentives have proved to be not very e￿ective in boosting private insurance take up,
4government might invest more resources in health information programmes. My re-
sults can be read as evidence that these programmes can contribute to reducing health
inequalities. Therefore, when evaluating their bene￿ts/costs, governments should ex-
plicitly take account of their indirect e￿ects on private insurance take up. The paper
is organized as follows. In Section 2 I provide some background on the data and
on the institutional context of private health insurance in the selected EU countries.
Section 3 provides descriptive evidence and outlines the empirical strategy. Section 4
presents the ￿ndings and Section 5 concludes.
2 Background
2.1 SHARE
I draw on information from the two waves of SHARE, which surveyed the 50+ pop-
ulation, in 2004 and 2006. This survey is multidisciplinary and uses a cross-sectional
panel database with a wide range of topics, including physical health, socioeconomic
status, income and intensity of social interaction. Some questions refer to households
(e.g. income), others are addressed to all eligible members within a household and
their partners: for instance, indicators of health status and behaviour. SHARE also
includes a section with questions on preferences, beliefs, attitudes and other items.
There are detailed questions about the purchase and type of health insurance, and
health related out-of-pocket expenditures. The ￿rst wave of the survey covered more
than 30,000 individuals in 11 countries. Data from the second wave are still prelim-
inary for some countries. Of the original 11 countries covered by SHARE, I exploit
data on 8 for the econometric analysis. I exclude Switzerland and France since it is
not possible to follow most individuals over time, due to the provisional version of
the second wave data.10 I also exclude the Netherlands because of the institutional
features of that country’s healthcare system and the recent reform in the statutory
healthcare system. Until January 2006, Dutch healthcare combined Social Health In-
surance (SHI), which guaranteed basic insurance cover for low-income earners, with
a Private Health Insurance (PHI) scheme for high earners who could opt out of SHI.
10Moreover, the regulatory framework of the health insurance market in Switzerland di￿ers sub-
stantially from those in the remaining countries.
5As result, only 72% of the Dutch population was covered by the statutory health
insurance (the average for the other countries is above 90%). The 2006 Healthcare
Act scrapped the division between SHI and PHI and introduced a single insurance
regime.
With the exception only of Germany and Austria, individuals aged over 75 are not
able to buy private hospital insurance and contracts for older people are usually on
an annual basis. My ￿nal sample includes 5,676 males and 6,597 females in Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain and Sweden, aged between 50 and
75.
2.2 Institutional Setting
This section provides some basic detail on the regulatory framework of private health
insurance in selected countries. There are di￿erent types of VPHI, but they can be
classi￿ed into three major types according to how they integrate the public system:
duplicate, complement and supplement. I do not deal with duplicate coverage in this
work. Complementary private insurance provides full or partial cover for services that
are excluded or not fully covered by the statutory health care system. It is available
for the whole population, albeit in di￿erent forms, in all the countries in our anal-
ysis. Supplementary health insurance serves to increase consumer choice and access
to di￿erent health services, guaranteeing faster access to treatment and increasing
the quality of accommodation and amenities. In most cases, supplementary private
insurances increases choice of provider and bene￿ts. Individuals with supplemen-
tary insurance may be treated in private hospitals, buy private treatment in public
hospitals, or receive bene￿ts in cash rather than in kind. Supplementary insurance
sometimes is described as "double coverage".
In most European countries there is universal basic coverage, but there are a
few exceptions. In Germany about 9% of the population is covered by primary pri-
vate insurance (the self-employed who are excluded from the social security system,
employees above an income threshold who opt for private insurance, and public em-
ployees, for the portion of health care expenditure not directly reimbursed by the
government). Similarly, in Belgium, Spain and Austria there are small percentages
of the population (mainly comprising self-employed and civil servants) who are not
6covered by primary health insurance.
I now describe the methods used to set private insurance premiums and the vari-
ables used in risk ratings as these are essential for the "positive correlation" test
presented in the next section. Risk rating is the method most commonly used by in-
surers in the EU to set prices for complementary and supplementary VPHI. It is used
to varying degrees and for di￿erent types of VPHI in all the countries in this analysis.
Table 1 provides examples of the variables used to set premiums. These include age,
sex, occupation, household size, medical history, family history. Group rating is used
in Denmark, Greece, Italy and Sweden mainly for group policies. In Belgium mutual
associations can sell policies with ￿at rate premiums, but these are not widespread.
Insurers that use health status as a variable in risk rating premiums require applicants
to complete a medical questionnaire. This questionnaire can include questions about
a family’s history of disease.11 The use of medical examinations to set premiums is
not widespread in the countries analysed.12
Tax incentives are in place in most countries in my sample with some impor-
tant di￿erences. In Denmark and Spain there are no deductions for employees, but
￿rms can deduct employer based premiums from tax. In Germany, Greece, Italy and
Sweden there are tax provisions for individuals, but not for employers.
There is no systematic evidence on the market structure of private health insurance
across EU countries. In 2005, Italy and Spain had the highest number of health
insurance companies (respectively 93 and 87) and Austria and Sweden had the lowest
(respectively 7 and 6). Mossialos and Thomson (2004) collecting data from di￿erent
sources ￿nd evidence that market concentration, measured by the market shares of
the three largest insurers, is particularly high in Austria (84%), Sweden (80-90%) and
Greece (70.4%). Concentration rates are much smaller in Belgium (49%) and Italy
(33%). Data on the administrative costs of voluntary health insurers are limited,
although the available evidence suggests that these costs are high compared to those
in the statutory healthcare system. Voluntary health insurers’ administrative costs
range between 10 per cent in Germany to as high as 25 per cent in Austria, Belgium
and Italy.
11According to Mossialos and Thomson (2004) family history of disease is required only in Greece.
12While Austria explicitly forbids insurers to conduct medical examinations, in Belgium they are
common practice for commercial policies.
73 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Descriptives
Figure 3 shows the proportion of individuals aged 50-75 covered by private hospital
insurance. Belgium and Austria are the countries with the highest take up, while
Italy, Sweden and Greece have the lowest. The high coverage in Belgium is partly
due to the special regime for the self-employed, which accounts for about 6% of the
total population in this older age group. The statutory health insurance scheme does
not cover self-employed people for ‘minor risks’, which include minor operations.13
In order to understand how the quality of the healthcare system a￿ects the propen-
sity to sign a private health insurance I split the sample by quality of the country’s
healthcare system. Identifying a universally accepted indicator of healthcare quality
is almost impossible. For the purposes of this work the number of hospital beds is the
best measure of the potential bene￿t from taking out a voluntary private insurance
to cover the costs of hospital care.14 The average number of hospital beds is signif-
icantly higher in Austria, Belgium and Germany than in the other countries in our
analysis. In the main speci￿cation I refer to Germany (with an average of 8.6 beds
per 1,000 inhabitants), Austria (7.8) and Belgium (7.5) as the high quality countries
and Greece (4.7), Italy (4), Denmark (3.8), Spain (3.4) and Sweden (3) as the low
quality countries. While separate statistics on beds in private hospitals are not avail-
able, it should be remembered that hospital private insurance allows policy holders
to purchase services in private hospitals as well as amenities in public ones, such as
private rooms. Reassuringly, an alternative widely used measure, number of GPs,
produces the same categories. Belgium and Austria have the highest number of GPs
(respectively 2.1 and 1.5 per 1,000 inhabitants), Sweden and Greece the lowest (0.6
and 0.3). In Section 4.4 I test for the robustness of my results using an alternative
measure for healthcare quality.
In order to de￿ne the individual accident probability, I use the following question:
"During the last 12 months have you been in a hospital over night?". Figure 5 plots the
average probability of being in hospital overnight in the 12 months before the 2006
13However, the hospital insurance coverage does not vary signi￿cantly between self-employed and
employed people in Belgium.
14According to Eurobarometer (2003) in 2003 27.5% of citizens in Austria were dissatis￿ed with
the healthcare system vs 78.1% and 65.5% respectively in Greece and Italy.
8interviews of subjects interviewed in the 2004 wave. The high quality healthcare
countries on average display a higher average probability of entering hospital, but
while in Austria the probability is much higher for those covered by private hospital
insurance, in Belgium and Germany the probability is slightly higher for those not
covered by insurance. Among individuals living in low quality healthcare countries
the risk of entering hospital is much higher for those not covered by hospital insurance.
The di￿erence between insured and not insured is particularly striking in Italy and
Sweden, providing evidence of some advantageous selection.
In order to measure whether individuals have residual private information with
respect to the risk assessment exercises performed by insurance companies, I use the
self assessed survival probability. In SHARE 2004 the question is worded: "What are
the chances that you will live to be age T or more?". The target age, T, contained
in this question was chosen conditional on the respondent’s age, and the distance
between current age and target age varied from 10 to 24 years.15 Guiso et al. (2005)
provide evidence based on SHARE that up to age 60, respondents’ subjective survival
probabilities and their life-table counterparts correspond very well for males but that
females tend to underestimate their survival rates. For older people, especially males,
there is some evidence of overstatement relative to the life tables.
One well-known problem with self reported probabilities is the propensity of re-
spondents to report round ￿gures such as 0,50, 100 (see Hurd and McGarry (1995)
and Gan et al. (2005)). As emphasized in Finkelstein and McGarry (2006), if in-
dividuals use probabilistic information in their decision to buy insurance, but are
unable to translate their latent probability into numbers, the estimates are likely to
be underestimates of the extent of individual information. Figure 5 plots the self-
assessed probability of being alive at age 75 for individuals aged 50-65 in the 2004
wave. While individuals living in low quality healthcare countries seem more ‘op-
timistic’ about their survival probability, there are no substantial di￿erences in the
degree of rounding between the two groups.
Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) and Cutler et al. (2008) stress the role of risk
aversion as the explanation for rejection of the "positive correlation" test. The 2006
wave of SHARE elicited information on risk aversion. Individuals were asked to
15E.g. for individuals in the age group 51-55 the target age is 75; for individuals in the age group
71-75 the target age is 85.
9choose, from four statements, which was closest to the level of ￿nancial risk they
would be willing to undertake over savings or making an investment.16 Figure 6
displays the distribution of this measure of risk aversion for the samples of both low
and high quality healthcare countries: almost 80% of respondents in both groups
declared they were not willing to take any ￿nancial risk. A Kolmogorov Smirnov
test fails to reject the null hypothesis that the two samples are drawn from the same
distribution, supporting the hypothesis that risk aversion does not explain the large
cross country variation in hospital insurance take up.
Table 2 reports how average years of education and cognitive abilities vary across
countries. Germans and Austrians, on average, are the best educated (respectively
with 13.8 and 13.3 years of education). In order to construct the memory indicator,
respondents were shown a list of ten words and then asked to recall them. The
indicator is constructed by counting the number of words recalled, and ranges from 0,
in the case that a respondent was not able to remember even one word, to 10. In the
rest of the paper, I use the terminology from the cognitive psychology literature and
refer to this indicator as memory recall, or simply recall. Recall scores are highest for
Denmark and Germany (respectively 5.8 and 5.6). Executive function is measured by
asking the respondent to name as many animals as possible in exactly one minute.
Each respondent is given a score, which is equal to the number of animals that she or
he is able to name. I refer to this indicator as verbal ￿uency, or simply ￿uency. The
￿uency score, de￿ned over the range 0-100, peaks for Sweden and Austria (respectively
24.4 and 22.7), with the lowest values for Italy, Spain and Greece (all below 16). Recall
and ￿uency are commonly regarded as proxying for the ability to acquire information.
The indicator for numeracy measures the ability to perform basic numerical oper-
ations. SHARE respondents were asked to perform the following simple calculations:
(1) ￿nd 10 percent of a number; (2) ￿nd one half of a number; (3) ￿nd the number
for which another known number represents two thirds; (4) ￿nd 10 percent of another
number. Each of the questions refers to a speci￿c economic or ￿nancial situation. On
the basis of these four questions I constructed a numeracy indicator, which ranges
from 1 to 5.17 The numeracy indicator varies between 1 and 5 and the highest values
16The statements are: 1) Take substantial ￿nancial risks expecting to earn substantial returns; 2)
Take above average ￿nancial risks expecting to earn above average returns; 3) Take average ￿nancial
risks expecting to earn average returns; 4) Not willing to take any ￿nancial risks.
17The same indicator is used by Christelis et al. (2005).
10are for Sweden and Germany (both around 3.8).
3.2 Empirical Method
The ￿rst step of my analysis is to perform the "positive correlation" test introduced
by Chiappori and Salanie (2001). For this purpose I estimate the following bivariate
probit:
Prob(Hosp = 1) = ©(X’¯1) (1)
Prob(HIns = 1) = ©(X’¯2) (2)
where Hosp is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the individual has spent
at least one night in hospital in the 12 months preceding the 2006 interview. HIns is
binary variable that takes the value 1 if the individual had hospital insurance cover in
2004. X is a vector of the covariates to control for the risk classi￿cation that would
be assigned to an individual by an insurance company in 2004. All the regressions
control for country ￿xed e￿ects.
Following Chiappori and Salanie (2001), the key parameter is the correlation be-
tween the error terms in equations (1) and (2). A unidimensional model of asymmetric
information predicts that the residuals of the two equations are positively correlated
(½>0) and do not reject the null hyphotesis that ½ = 0 would represent a failure to
reject the null of symmetric information.18
In order to test whether the individual has residual private information I estimate
the model in equations (1) and (2) by including individual self reported survival
probability as elicited from the 2004 wave of SHARE. Finkelstein and McGarry (2006)
use the self-reported probability of nursing home use 5 years in the future to test
for the presence of asymmetric information in the long term care insurance market.
The coe￿cients of interest in this case are: those for survival probability in (1) and
(2)19 and the correlation coe￿cient, ½. If the coe￿cients of survival probability are
18A second approach proposed by Finkelstein and Poterba (2004) consists of estimating a probit
for accident risk as a function of private insurance cover, controlling for risk classi￿cation. The
results of this alternative approach are not presented here, but are consistent with those that are.
19In a bivariate probit model the marginal e￿ect is a function of the coe￿cient as well as of
the derivative of the conditional density functions. For notational simplicity, I sometimes use the
11signi￿cantly di￿erent from zero, there are two possible scenarios. On the one hand, if
½ is positive and statistically signi￿cant it might be concluded that individuals detain
private information on their own risk type. On the other hand, failure to reject the
null hypothesis automatically points to the existence of other sources of unobserved
heterogeneity which o￿set the positive correlation between insurance cover and risk
occurrence.
The validity of my private information test relies on the ability to condition on
the risk classi￿cation of the individual by insurance companies. Using information
in Mossialos and Thomson (2004) and from insurance applications to numerous in-
surance companies, I can determine which are the individual characteristics that
insurance companies observe when setting the price of a hospital insurance policy.
As mentioned in the previous section, all companies collect a set of demographic
characteristics - age, gender, marital status, age of the partner, family size, residence
in a metropolitan area - as well as detailed information on current and past health.
The same information is gathered by SHARE, whose data on current health and
medical history are extremely rich and detailed. Therefore, I can replicate insurers’
information. Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) proposes two alternative methods to
control for insurers’ risk classi￿cation. The ￿rst consists of the actuarial prediction
of individuals‘ risk types, because this is the measure used to generate the insurance
premium.
In this paper I use the alternative "application information" approach since I do
not have information on the actuarial model used by insurers. In this speci￿cation I
attempt to control for all the aspects that insurance companies might observe about
an individual. I include a full set of single year age dummies, all the demographic
information that insurance companies collect in their applications (sex, marital sta-
tus, age of spouse, household size, occupational status, residence in a metropolitan
area) and indicator variables for each of the detailed current health and health his-
tory characteristics. These indicator variables include: limitations to each of three
activities involved in daily living and two instrumental activities of daily living; low
body mass index; high body mass index; a smoker or not; incidence of depression
in the previous four weeks; subject to diabetes, hypertension, cholesterol, arthritis,
asthma; history of stroke, cancer, heart attack, lung disease; medication for a heart
coe￿cient when referring to the marginal e￿ect.
12condition, high blood pressure, diabetes; consultation in the previous 12 months with
a GP, a specialist. To be conservative, I also control for household income and wealth
terciles, although from my research it emerged that few insurance companies would
ask individuals to classify themselves as high, medium or low income.
4 Results
4.1 Baseline results
The standard test for asymmetric information, based on a positive correlation be-
tween insurance cover and risk occurrence conditional on insurance companies’ risk
classi￿cation, has been applied across a variety of insurance markets with di￿ering
results. In the case of health insurance, Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000) review an
extensive literature and ￿nd mixed evidence.
Table 3 shows the results of this standard test, for the hospital insurance market,
for eight European countries. The ￿rst row presents the correlation of the residuals
estimated from the bivariate probit. I am unable to reject the null hypothesis of zero
correlation. In order to gain some insights into how the operation of the insurance
market is a￿ected by the quality of the healthcare system I estimate separate bivariate
probit models for the subsample of individuals living in countries with high quality
healthcare (Austria, Belgium and Germany) and those living in countries with low
quality healthcare (Denmark, Greece, Italy, Spain and Sweden). While the correlation
coe￿cient is positive for both samples, it is never statistically di￿erent from zero. In
textbook adverse selection models, where individuals have only private information
about their risk type, this result would imply that there is no asymmetric information.
On the other hand, if other sources of private information are allowed, failure to reject
the null hypothesis does not rule out the existence of asymmetric information.
I augment the model in equations (1) and (2) by including the self reported survival
probability. Columns 1 and 2 in Table 4 report the results for the bivariate probit
model estimated for the full sample. I ￿nd that, after controlling for the insurers’
risk classi￿cation, the survival probability is negatively and signi￿cantly correlated
with the probability of an overnight stay in hospital in the succeeding 2 years. The
survival probability is positively, but not signi￿cantly correlated with the probability
13of signing a private hospital insurance. Nevertheless, the correlation coe￿cient for
the residuals of the two equations is in line with that estimated above and is not
signi￿cantly di￿erent from zero.
In countries with low quality healthcare systems, the survival probability is nega-
tively and signi￿cantly correlated with the probability of an overnight stay in hospital:
a 10 percentage points increase in the survival probability reduces the probability of
being in hospital over night by 3.9 percentage points. For individuals living in low
quality health care countries, the survival probability is positively and signi￿cantly
(at the 5% level) correlated with the probability of signing up for a hospital insurance:
a 10 percentage point increase in the survival probability is associated with a 2.3 per-
centage point increase in the probability of signing up for a hospital insurance. It is
beyond the scope of this work to give a causal interpretation of this correlation. While
survival probability might have a direct e￿ect on the decision to take out a private
insurance, there might be other factors correlated with both aspects. Nevertheless,
the correlation coe￿cient of the residuals in the two equations, although positive, is
not statistically signi￿cant. This result can be read as evidence that individuals do
not have additional private information on their own risk type.
The results are quite di￿erent for the model estimated for the sub-sample of high
quality healthcare countries. The correlation between survival probability and hos-
pital insurance is small and not signi￿cantly di￿erent from zero. The marginal e￿ect
of survival probability on accident probability is negative: a 10 percentage point in-
crease in the survival probability reduces the probability of being in hospital by 5.7
percentage points but is marginally signi￿cant at 10% level. Also, in this case, there
is no evidence of a positive and signi￿cant correlation between the error terms in the
two equations.
As expected both household income and total wealth are positively and signi￿-
cantly correlated with the probability of having a hospital private insurance, irrespec-
tive of the quality of healthcare system. In a few countries insurance companies are
allowed to collect information on the family history of certain diseases. While this
information is not available in SHARE, I estimate an alternative speci￿cation that
controls for whether parents are still living and, if not, at what age they died. The
results are in line with those presented above. Overall, these results suggest that in
countries with low quality healthcare there are unobserved individual characteristics
14that are positively correlated with hospital insurance cover and negatively correlated
with accident risk, as measured by the ex post probability of being in hospital over
night. This opposite correlation o￿sets the positive association between risk type and
insurance coverage.
4.2 The Importance of Health Information
In this section I test whether the ability to acquire information about health related is-
sues is a potential explanation for the opposite correlation documented above. On the
one hand, better informed individuals are more likely to purchase private insurance.
There is well established evidence that more informed individuals are more likely to
buy more sophisticated retirement saving plans.20 Gertler et al. (1994), using direct
measures of information, ￿nd that imperfect information a￿ects the demand for sup-
plemental Medicare insurance. Jin and Sorensen (2006) use data on the enrolment
decisions of federal pensioners in the US to show the in￿uence of publicized ratings on
health plan choices. Paccagnella et al. (2008), using SHARE data, provide evidence
that, while the main determinants of voluntary private health insurance vary across
countries, education and cognitive abilities have a strong positive e￿ect on holding a
VPHI policy in most countries. On the other hand, better informed individuals are
less likely to engage in risky behaviours (e.g. drinking, smoking) and are more likely
to undergo preventive screening.21 To acquire their health information consumers use
formal (health professionals) or informal (newspapers, books, the Internet, friends)
sources of information.22
Di￿erent types of health related information might be relevant. Individuals might
be more informed about health risk factors and the bene￿ts of early screening. All
else being equal, they might simply be better informed about the healthcare system’s
functioning and its quality standards: for instance, individuals aware of the poor
quality of the public hospitals might sign a private insurance in order to secure faster
20Du￿o and Saez (2003) provide evidence on the role of information and social interactions on
Retirement Plan Decisions using ￿eld data from a sample of university sta￿.
21Kenkel (1991) ￿nds that more informed individuals tend to display healthier life styles. Kenkel
(1990) provides evidence that poorly informed consumers tend to underestimate the productivity of
medical care in treating illness.
22Bundorf et al. (2004) report that in 2001 38% of Americans looked for or obtained information
about their personal health from a source other than their doctors.
15and cheaper access to a private hospital. One limitation of my analysis is that I
cannot identify these di￿erences among health information contents. I present two
pieces of evidence to assess whether the ability to acquire health related information
is an important determinant of health insurance take up.
First, I test whether the correlation between the proxies for individual ability to
acquire health information and the decision to buy hospital insurance is higher in
low quality than high quality healthcare countries. The rationale behind this test
is straightforward: if the average cost of acquiring health information from health
professionals is inversely related to healthcare quality, the individual ability to acquire
information through alternative channels should be systematically more important in
low quality than in high quality countries.23 I estimate separate probit models for
the dummy for having private hospital insurance in 2004 on di￿erent proxies for the
ability to acquire information, for the low quality and high quality healthcare country
groups. The results are reported in Table 5.
The upper panel in the table shows the e￿ect of years of education, memory recall
score and verbal ￿uency score on the probability of signing private hospital insurance
in the sample of low quality healthcare countries. For each cognitive skill variable I
estimate two speci￿cations. The ￿rst includes the main socio-demographic charac-
teristics and the dummies for the main risky behaviours, i.e. smoking, obesity, lack
of physical exercise. In the second speci￿cation I include controls for the individual’s
health history and healthcare utilization, namely whether they have consulted a doc-
tor at least once in the last 12 months and if they have been in hospital over night
in the 12 months prior to the 2004 interviews. A one standard deviation increase in
years of education signi￿cantly increases the probability of buying a private hospital
insurance by about 1.5 percentage points. In a sample of elderly people, in particular,
education might not re￿ect current ability to acquire information. Memory recall and
verbal ￿uency scores are positively and signi￿cantly correlated with the probability of
signing a private hospital insurance in the sample of low quality healthcare countries.
A one standard deviation increase in the memory recall score increases the probabil-
ity by 1.9 percentage points, while a one standard deviation increase in the verbal
￿uency score increases the probability by 1.5 percentage points. The lower panel in
23According to Eurobarometer (2003) 20.1% of European citizens use either books or maga-
zine/newspapers as their main sources of health information.
16Table 5 presents the results for the sample of high healthcare quality countries. The
size of the e￿ect of years of education is in line with the result for the low healthcare
quality countries, but is not statistically signi￿cant. The marginal e￿ects of recall
and ￿uency are both small and not statistically di￿erent from zero.
Second, I exploit variations in the average quality of health promotion across EU
regions to study whether the e￿ect of education and cognitive ability on insurance
purchase varies with the average quality of health related information. The ratio of
the test is in line with that presented above: given the same healthcare organization,
the ability to acquire health information through "informal" channels should matter
less in those regions where the cost of acquiring information from "formal" sources
is lower. In particular, a common feature of the countries considered in this study is
that regional governments are largely independent in their allocation of health care
resources. Therefore, within the same country the quality of health promotion can
vary dramatically across regions.
Using information on respondents’ region of residence (105 regions in total), I
construct di￿erent measures for quality of health promotion. My preferred indicator
is the proportion of individuals aged over 65 who have been advised to have a ￿u
vaccination. Vaccination against ￿u has been proved to be a cost e￿ective way to
reduce the incidence of respiratory diseases and is o￿ered free of charge to people
over 65 in most EU countries. Unlike other preventive treatments, it can be o￿ered
and administered by doctors, pharmacists and nurses. The reason for my focus on
the percentage advised to have the vaccination rather than on e￿ective take up is that
the former is a better proxy for the quality of supply of health promotion, while the
latter could be considered as an equilibrium outcome that potentially can be a￿ected
by other factors.
Denoting Vj as the proportion of individuals aged 65 or over who have been advised
to have the ￿u vaccination in region j, I estimate the following model:
HInsij = ® + ¯1Ei + ¯2Vj + ¯3Ei ¤ Vj + °
0Xij + uij (3)
where HInsij takes the value 1 if an individual i in region j was covered by a
hospital insurance in year 2004, Ei controls for education (cognitive ability) of individ-
ual i. Xij controls, among other things, for demographic characteristics, individual’s
17health history, socio-demographic characteristics of region of residence, and a full set
of country dummies.
To the extent that health related information explains hospital insurance decisions,
I expect ¯1 to be positive and ¯3 to be negative. I estimate the model in equation (3)
using both a linear probability and a probit model. Estimation results for the probit
model are reported in Table 6. For each proxy for the ability to acquire information
I estimate two speci￿cations, where the second one includes controls for regional
characteristics: proportion of people aged over 65, proportion of women, dummies for
the terciles of regional wealth and waiting time for outpatient treatment.
My results show that years of education and cognitive abilities are all positively
correlated with the probability of signing a private hospital insurance. On average
an extra year of education increases the probability of signing a private hospital
insurance by 0.5 percentage points. However, the e￿ect declines signi￿cantly as the
regional quality of health promotion improves. There is a potential risk that the
proportion of people aged over 65 that have been advised to have a ￿u vaccination
is not a proxy just for the quality of the health promotion, but acts as a measure of
the overall healthcare system. It is reassuring that when I control for other regional
characteristics, the marginal e￿ects of the interaction terms do not vary. The results
in columns 3 and 4 of Table 6 show that the substitutability between the ability to
acquire information and the quality of health promotion is particularly strong when
the former is measured by the score reported in the recall test. A one standard
deviation increase in the score for the recall test is associated with an increase of 1.6
percentage points in the probability of signing a private hospital insurance.
The marginal e￿ects on the interactions are hard to interpret. In order to provide
a measure of the magnitude of the substitutability between recall and regional quality
of health promotion, I undertake the following. I investigate what is the di￿erential
e￿ect of a one standard deviation increase in the recall score for a person living in
a region with low quality healthcare promotion compared to the e￿ect for a person
living in a high quality health promotion region. I classify as low (high) quality health
promotion those regions where the average proportion of individuals aged 65 plus
that are advised to have a ￿u vaccination is one standard deviation below (above)
the mean.24 The e￿ect of one standard deviation increase in the recall test is 1.2
24The average proportion is 0.63 and the standard deviation is 0.23.
18percentage points higher in regions with low quality healthcare promotion compared
to regions with high quality promotion.
In section 3.1 I referred to the SHARE survey collecting information on the ability
to perform mathematical operations, i.e., the numeracy indicator. According to the
cognitive psychology literature this is a proxy for the ability to process as opposed to
the ability to acquire information. While the literature shows that numerical ability
is positively correlated with the propensity to buy more complex retirement plans
and invest in the stock market,25 I do not expect any signi￿cant substitutability
between the ability to perform mathematical operations and the regional quality of
health promotion. I ￿nd consistently that while the average e￿ect of numeracy is
strong and signi￿cant, the marginal e￿ect on the interaction term is negative, but not
signi￿cantly di￿erent from zero.
The ￿ndings provide evidence supporting the hypothesis that individuals with a
greater ability to acquire health information through informal sources need to rely less
on the information provided by formal sources in deciding whether to buy a health
insurance.
4.3 Econometric concerns
So far, I have argued that the fact that the e￿ect of education and cognitive abilities
on the probability of taking out a hospital insurance declines as the quality of health
promotion increases, is evidence that the cost of health information matters in the
decision to buy a private health insurance. Identi￿cation of the information channel
e￿ect might be confounded by the possible presence of factors that are correlated
with the variables of interest. Decomposing the error term in equation (3) into two
components uij = ²ij+¹j makes it clear that there might be omitted factors that vary
at both the individual-regional and regional levels. More education and better cogni-
tive ability might be associated with lower discount rates and higher risk aversion,26
inducing individuals to buy more private insurance and to move to regions where
the quality of the healthcare is higher. In that case I would expect the interaction
25See Christelis et al. (2005).
26Cutler and Lleras-Muney (2008) argue that on average people with more schooling learn to
dislike risk more. However, the empirical relationship between education and risk aversion appears
to be u-shaped: very high and very low education levels are associated with more risk taking, whereas
individuals with moderate amounts of schooling are the most risk averse.
19between education (cognitive abilities) and proportion of individuals in a region who
have been advised to have a ￿u vaccination to be positive. If anything, my results
should represent a downward biased estimate of the degree of substitutability.
Even in the absence of endogenous sorting, if the measures of the ability to acquire
information are positively correlated with risk aversion, my results potentially might
be explained by the fact that more risk averse individuals are more likely to buy
private insurance as a response to the poor quality of the public healthcare. In
order to rule out this hypothesis, I test whether the e￿ect of education and cognitive
abilities increases with the average waiting time in the region. The marginal e￿ect
of the interaction terms, while always positive, is statistically signi￿cant only when I
take the interaction of the ￿uency score with the dummy for the highest tercile (see
Table 7).
The proportion of individuals advised to have a ￿u vaccination potentially might
be correlated with other regional characteristics unrelated to the quality of health pro-
motion, which might a￿ect the take up of private insurance. Since additional health
and pension coverage are often part of the extended bene￿ts o￿ered by employers,
information on employer provided bene￿ts might be higher in the more business ori-
ented regions within the same country. In order to rule out this explanation I test
whether the e￿ect of education, and the proxies for cognitive ability, on the prob-
ability of having a private pension decline with my indicator for health promotion.
The results in Table 8 show no evidence of a signi￿cant interaction between regional
quality of health promotion and proxies for the ability to acquire information, in the
decision to subscribe to a private pension plan.
So far, I have assumed that the only relevant type of information is health related,
but this might not necessarily be the case. Private health insurance might be part
of a broader package that includes other types of insurances, e.g. life insurance,
home insurance. Therefore, individuals might be more likely to buy private hospital
insurances in those regions where the quality of the ￿nancial information is better.
In order to test this hypothesis, I study whether the e￿ect of education and cognitive
abilities is lower in those regions where there is a higher percentage of individuals
aged 50 or over who are stockholders. While the regional proportion of stockholders
is positively associated with the propensity to buy a private hospital insurance, its
correlation with hospital insurance purchase does not vary signi￿cantly with education
20and cognitive ability (see Table 9).
4.4 Robustness checks
Central to my analysis of residual private information is how countries are classi￿ed
as high or low healthcare quality. As an alternative criterion, I use per-capita health
expenditure in constant dollar values, as measured by the World Health Organiza-
tion. In 2002 Germany had the highest health expenditure in Europe, with 2,817$
per capita, while Spain had the lowest with 1,640$. Based on this criterion, Aus-
tria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany and Sweden would be categorized as high quality
healthcare countries; Greece Italy and Spain would be classi￿ed as poor healthcare
countries. I test separately for the e￿ect of survival probability on the probability
of buying a private hospital insurance and on the accident risk at time t + 1 (see
Table AI). In line with my previous results, survival probability has a positive and
signi￿cant e￿ect on the propensity to buy a hospital insurance only in poor health-
care quality countries. When I test whether education and cognitive abilities have
a di￿erential e￿ect on the probability of signing a health insurance, I ￿nd that the
e￿ect is positive and statistically signi￿cant only for poor healthcare quality countries
(see Table AII).
I test equation (3) using an alternative measure for regional healthcare promotion.
According to medical guidelines colonoscopy should be recommended to individuals
aged 50 or over, independent of the individual’s health history. Unlike the ￿u vacci-
nation, the test is usually advised by a specialist or a GP, and only in a few countries
is free of charge for the over 50s. As an alternative measure for the quality of health-
care promotion I use the regional proportions of individuals aged 50-85 that have
been advised to have a colonoscopy. The results in Table AIII are in line with those
presented in Table 6.
5 Conclusions
This paper presents evidence from the ￿rst two waves of SHARE to identify whether
di￿erential costs in accessing health information can explain partially cross country
variation in the take up of private health insurance.
21While, on average, health insurance coverage in European countries is very low,
it is higher in those countries which, according to many criteria, have better health-
care systems. In this paper I focus on private hospital insurance to study whether
individuals who live in areas with better healthcare quality are more likely to buy
insurance because they have better health information. Using individual self assess-
ments of survival probability, I ￿rst test whether individuals have private information
on insurance determinants not observed by insurers. I ￿nd that the individual sur-
vival probability is positively correlated with the probability of signing a hospital
private insurance and negatively correlated with the ex post probability of admission
to hospital. This opposite association is strong and signi￿cant only in countries with
low quality healthcare system. However, there is no evidence of a positive correlation
between insurance coverage and individuals’ risk experience, in either high or low
quality countries.
To seek for possible explanations for this result, I looked at the role of health
information. As more informed individuals are more likely to buy private insurance
and less likely to experience health risk, I tested whether individuals who live in better
healthcare quality countries are better informed. Exploiting both cross country and
within country variations in quality, I provide evidence that, when deciding to buy a
private insurance, individuals who are more able to acquire health information from
informal sources, i.e. the Internet, newspapers, books, rely less on the information
provided by healthcare professionals.
My results provide evidence of signi￿cant substitutability between the individual
ability to acquire information and the quality of healthcare promotion. While tax
incentives have proved to not be successful in boosting the take up of private health
insurance, these ￿ndings can be read as evidence that investments in health promo-
tion can have positive indirect e￿ects on the propensity to buy private insurance.
Therefore, when evaluating the bene￿ts and costs of health promotion programmes
government should take explicit account of their indirect e￿ects.
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25Figure 1: The Health Insurance Puzzle in Europe
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Note: The graph in the top panel plots the proportion of individuals aged 50+
covered by private insurance for hospital treatment versus the average number
of hospital beds per 1,000 inhabitants. The graph in the bottom panel plots
out-of-pocket expenditure (expressed in logs), calculated as the sum of out-of-
pocket expenditure for impatient and outpatient treatments, versus the average
number of hospital beds per 1,000 inhabitants. Private insurance cover and out-
of-pocket expenditure are computed on SHARE data. The data on hospital beds
are from EUROSTAT and refer to year 2004.
26Figure 2: Private Hospital Insurance Coverage vs Healthcare System
Quality in EU regions
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Note: The graph plots predicted private hospital insurance coverage as recorded
in 2004 versus average number of hospital beds per 1,000 inhabitants in 94
regions across 8 SHARE countries. Predicted coverage is obtained from an
OLS regression of regional private insurance coverage on regional number of
hospital beds and country ￿xed e￿ects. Data on hospital beds are from the
REGIO EUROSTAT dataset. Hospital data at regional level are not available
for Denmark and Sweden.
27Figure 3: International Comparison: Hospital Insurance Coverage
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Figure 4: Accident Risk by Hospital Insurance Status
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Note: Accident risk is de￿ned as the average probability of having an overnight
stay in hospital in the 12 months preceding the 2006 interviews, for individuals
aged 50-75 in the 2004 wave. Insurance status is de￿ned according to 2004
responses.
28Figure 5: Self-Assessed Survival Probability at the age 75
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Note: The sample includes individuals aged 50-65 in the 2004 wave. The target
age in the survival probability question is 75. Low Quality Healthcare Countries
include Denmark, Greece, Italy, Spain and Sweden. High Quality Healthcare
Countries include Austria, Belgium and Germany.
Figure 6: Risk aversion
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Note: The sample includes all individuals aged 50 or over interviewed in both
2004 and 2006. Information on risk averseness was elicited in the 2006 wave
and is measured by the propensity to take substantial ￿nancial risks with the
expectation of earning substantial returns. 1 is the lowest level of risk aversion,
4 the highest (see text for explanations).
29T
a
b
l
e
1
:
V
P
H
I
r
a
t
i
n
g
c
r
i
t
e
r
i
a
C
o
u
n
t
r
y
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
u
s
e
d
f
o
r
r
a
t
i
n
g
p
r
e
m
i
u
m
s
M
e
d
i
c
a
l
I
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
P
r
o
c
e
d
u
r
e
s
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
f
o
r
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
A
u
s
t
r
i
a
A
g
e
a
t
e
n
t
r
y
,
s
e
x
,
m
a
r
i
t
a
l
I
n
s
u
r
e
r
s
a
r
e
p
r
o
h
i
b
i
t
e
d
s
t
a
t
u
s
,
i
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
h
e
a
l
t
h
s
t
a
t
u
s
b
y
l
a
w
f
r
o
m
c
a
r
r
y
i
n
g
o
u
t
e
x
a
m
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
s
B
e
l
g
i
u
m
M
u
t
u
a
l
:
g
r
o
u
p
r
a
t
e
s
a
c
c
o
r
d
i
n
g
t
o
t
h
e
l
e
v
e
l
o
f
c
o
v
e
r
a
g
e
.
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
:
M
u
t
u
a
l
:
o
n
l
y
s
o
m
e
m
u
t
u
a
l
s
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
a
m
e
d
i
c
a
l
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
n
a
i
r
e
.
a
g
e
,
s
e
x
,
a
r
e
a
o
f
r
e
s
i
d
e
n
c
e
,
l
e
v
e
l
o
f
c
o
v
e
r
a
g
e
,
l
e
v
e
l
o
f
d
e
d
u
c
t
i
b
l
e
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
:
m
e
d
i
c
a
l
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
n
a
i
r
e
a
n
d
/
o
r
e
x
a
m
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
D
e
n
m
a
r
k
M
u
t
u
a
l
:
g
r
o
u
p
r
a
t
e
s
a
c
c
o
r
d
i
n
g
t
o
t
h
e
l
e
v
e
l
o
f
c
o
v
e
r
a
g
e
.
M
e
d
i
c
a
l
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
n
a
i
r
e
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
:
a
g
e
,
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
s
t
a
t
u
s
G
e
r
m
a
n
y
A
g
e
a
t
e
n
t
r
y
,
s
e
x
,
h
e
a
l
t
h
s
t
a
t
u
s
M
e
d
i
c
a
l
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
n
a
i
r
e
G
r
e
e
c
e
A
g
e
,
s
e
x
,
p
r
o
f
e
s
s
i
o
n
,
f
a
m
i
l
y
a
n
d
i
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
h
e
a
l
t
h
s
t
a
t
u
s
M
e
d
i
c
a
l
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
n
a
i
r
e
,
e
x
a
m
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
,
x
-
r
a
y
s
I
t
a
l
y
A
g
e
,
s
e
x
,
h
e
a
l
t
h
s
t
a
t
u
s
,
a
r
e
a
o
f
r
e
s
i
d
e
n
c
e
M
e
d
i
c
a
l
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
n
a
i
r
e
S
p
a
i
n
A
g
e
,
s
e
x
M
e
d
i
c
a
l
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
n
a
i
r
e
S
w
e
d
e
n
A
g
e
,
h
e
a
l
t
h
s
t
a
t
u
s
M
e
d
i
c
a
l
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
n
a
i
r
e
,
e
x
a
m
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
(
i
n
r
a
r
e
c
a
s
e
s
)
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
M
o
s
s
i
a
l
o
s
a
n
d
T
h
o
m
s
o
n
(
2
0
0
4
)
T
a
b
l
e
2
:
D
e
s
c
r
i
p
t
i
v
e
s
A
u
s
t
r
i
a
G
e
r
m
a
n
y
S
w
e
d
e
n
S
p
a
i
n
I
t
a
l
y
D
e
n
m
a
r
k
G
r
e
e
c
e
B
e
l
g
i
u
m
E
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
1
1
.
4
1
5
1
3
.
8
5
7
1
0
.
8
2
6
5
.
9
4
5
7
.
3
1
2
1
3
.
3
1
6
9
.
4
4
2
1
0
.
8
6
1
(
2
.
5
4
8
)
(
2
.
5
7
9
)
(
3
.
1
3
1
)
(
4
.
2
5
6
)
(
4
.
1
5
4
)
(
3
.
1
0
0
)
(
4
.
6
0
5
)
(
3
.
6
4
3
)
M
e
m
o
r
y
5
.
3
9
5
5
.
6
4
9
5
.
6
3
1
3
.
8
3
4
4
.
3
2
5
5
.
7
5
5
5
.
1
0
5
5
.
2
0
3
(
1
.
7
5
1
)
(
1
.
5
7
9
)
(
1
.
5
3
6
)
(
1
.
6
6
9
)
(
1
.
5
5
2
)
(
1
.
5
5
9
)
(
1
.
5
0
5
)
(
1
.
5
9
1
)
V
e
r
b
a
l
F
l
u
e
n
c
y
2
2
.
8
9
5
2
1
.
4
0
4
2
4
.
4
9
1
1
5
.
5
2
4
1
4
.
7
1
5
2
2
.
6
6
7
1
5
.
1
5
8
2
0
.
6
2
8
(
9
.
2
2
8
)
(
6
.
8
4
6
)
(
6
.
8
8
3
)
(
5
.
3
5
3
)
(
5
.
5
4
8
)
(
6
.
6
5
7
)
(
4
.
7
5
9
)
(
6
.
1
5
2
)
N
u
m
e
r
a
c
y
3
.
7
3
9
3
.
7
6
6
3
.
7
6
7
2
.
5
6
3
2
.
9
5
2
3
.
6
3
7
3
.
5
2
6
3
.
4
4
4
(
0
.
9
3
4
)
(
0
.
9
9
6
)
(
0
.
9
6
5
)
(
1
.
0
2
5
)
(
0
.
9
9
4
)
(
1
.
0
5
8
)
(
1
.
0
4
7
)
(
0
.
9
9
1
)
N
o
t
e
:
D
e
s
c
r
i
p
t
i
v
e
s
a
r
e
b
a
s
e
d
o
n
t
h
e
2
0
0
4
a
n
s
w
e
r
s
o
f
i
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
s
a
g
e
d
5
0
-
7
5
.
S
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
d
e
v
i
a
t
i
o
n
s
a
r
e
r
e
p
o
r
t
e
d
i
n
p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
i
s
.
30T
a
b
l
e
3
:
P
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
C
o
r
r
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
T
e
s
t
F
u
l
l
S
a
m
p
l
e
L
o
w
Q
u
a
l
i
t
y
H
e
a
l
t
h
c
a
r
e
H
i
g
h
Q
u
a
l
i
t
y
H
e
a
l
t
h
c
a
r
e
C
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
C
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
C
o
r
r
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
C
o
e
￿
.
0
.
0
4
5
0
.
0
5
8
0
.
0
3
5
B
i
v
a
r
i
a
t
e
P
r
o
b
i
t
(
½
)
L
i
k
e
l
.
R
a
t
i
o
T
e
s
t
(
½
=
0
)
1
.
4
3
7
0
.
8
0
4
0
.
5
8
2
I
n
s
u
r
e
r
s
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
C
o
u
n
t
r
y
D
u
m
m
i
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
O
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
5
8
2
8
3
6
4
1
2
1
8
7
N
o
t
e
:
*
*
*
d
e
n
o
t
e
s
s
i
g
n
i
￿
c
a
n
c
e
a
t
1
%
,
*
*
a
t
5
%
a
n
d
*
a
t
1
0
%
.
L
o
w
Q
u
a
l
i
t
y
H
e
a
l
t
h
c
a
r
e
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
D
e
n
m
a
r
k
,
G
r
e
e
c
e
,
I
t
a
l
y
S
p
a
i
n
a
n
d
S
w
e
d
e
n
.
H
i
g
h
Q
u
a
l
i
t
y
H
e
a
l
t
h
c
a
r
e
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
A
u
s
t
r
i
a
,
B
e
l
g
i
u
m
a
n
d
G
e
r
m
a
n
y
.
T
h
e
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
o
f
t
h
e
b
i
v
a
r
i
a
t
e
p
r
o
b
i
t
a
r
e
t
h
e
d
u
m
m
y
f
o
r
w
h
e
t
h
e
r
t
h
e
i
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
h
a
s
h
o
s
p
i
t
a
l
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
c
o
v
e
r
i
n
2
0
0
4
a
n
d
t
a
k
e
s
t
h
e
v
a
l
u
e
1
i
f
t
h
e
i
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
h
a
s
b
e
e
n
i
n
h
o
s
p
i
t
a
l
o
v
e
r
n
i
g
h
t
i
n
t
h
e
1
2
m
o
n
t
h
s
p
r
e
c
e
d
i
n
g
t
h
e
2
0
0
6
i
n
t
e
r
v
i
e
w
.
I
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
w
e
r
e
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
d
i
n
2
0
0
4
s
u
r
v
e
y
.
I
n
s
u
r
e
r
s
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
s
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
a
g
e
(
i
n
s
i
n
g
l
e
y
e
a
r
d
u
m
m
i
e
s
)
,
s
e
x
,
m
a
r
i
t
a
l
s
t
a
t
u
s
,
a
g
e
o
f
s
p
o
u
s
e
,
o
c
c
u
p
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
d
u
m
m
i
e
s
,
r
e
s
i
d
e
n
c
e
i
n
a
m
e
t
r
o
p
o
l
i
t
a
n
a
r
e
a
,
a
n
d
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
f
o
r
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
a
n
d
p
a
s
t
h
e
a
l
t
h
s
t
a
t
u
s
(
s
e
e
t
e
x
t
f
o
r
t
h
e
c
o
m
p
l
e
t
e
l
i
s
t
)
.
31Table 4: Test for residual private information
Full Sample Low Quality High Quality
Countries Countries
Hospital Hospital Hospital Hospital Hospital Hospital
Overnight Insurance Overnight Insurance Overnight Insurance
Survival Probability -0.047*** 0.023 -0.039** 0.023** -0.057* 0.013
(0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.011) (0.032) (0.046)
II Inc. Tercile -0.003 0.032** 0.008 0.011 -0.025 0.058*
(0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.009) (0.022) (0.033)
III Inc. Tercile -0.001 0.065*** -0.004 0.041*** -0.004 0.081**
(0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.012) (0.024) (0.034)
II Wealth Tercile -0.021* 0.043*** -0.018 0.020** -0.019 0.075**
(0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.009) (0.022) (0.034)
III Wealth Tercile -0.012 0.072*** -0.010 0.034*** -0.007 0.129***
(0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.011) (0.024) (0.034)
Correlation Coe￿. 0.047 0.071 0.036
Bivariate Probit (½)
Likel. Ratio Test (½=0) 1.499 1.159 0.588
Insurers Controls Yes Yes Yes
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5591 3463 2128
Note: *** denotes signi￿cance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. Marginal e￿ects from heteroskedas-
ticity robust bivariate probit are reported. Low Quality Healthcare countries include Denmark,
Greece, Italy Spain and Sweden. High Quality Healthcare countries include Austria, Belgium and
Germany. The dependent variables for the bivariate probit are the dummy for whether the individ-
ual owned a hospital private insurance in 2004 and a dummy that takes the value 1 if the individual
has been in hospital over night in the 12 months preceding the 2006 interview. Survival probability
has been rescaled to between 0 and 1. Individual characteristics were measured in 2004. Insurers’
Controls include age (in single year dummies), sex, marital status, age of spouse, occupational
dummies, residence in a metropolitan area, and variables for current and past health status (see
text for the complete list).
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33Table 6: Hospital Insurance Take Up and Quality of Health Promotion
Education 0.005*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001)
Recall 0.009*** 0.009***
(0.003) (0.003)
Fluency 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
% Advised Flu Vacc. 0.022 0.001 0.011 -0.008 -0.002 -0.023
(0.040) (0.044) (0.043) (0.043) (0.039) (0.047)
Education*% Advised Flu Vacc. -0.009 -0.011*
(0.006) (0.006)
Recall*% Advised Flu Vacc. -0.028** -0.033**
(0.015) (0.016)
Fluency*% Advised Flu Vacc. -0.007* -0.007**
(0.004) (0.003)
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Health History Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional Characteristics No Yes No Yes No Yes
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5870 5857 5869 5857 5855 5845
Note: *** denotes signi￿cance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. Marginal e￿ects from heteroskedas-
ticity robust univariate probit are reported. The dependent variable is the dummy for whether
the individual owned a private hospital insurance in 2004. The marginal e￿ect on the interaction
term has been calculated using the method suggested by Norton et al. (2004). Standard errors are
calculated using 500 bootstrap repetitions. % Advised Flu Vacc. is the proportion of individuals
in the region, aged 65 or over, that have been advised by a doctor or a health professional to have
a ￿u vaccination. Baseline controls include age, sex, marital status, occupational dummies, house-
hold size, household income (in logs) wealth terciles, dummies for whether the individual takes
moderate physical exercise, is obese and is a smoker as recorded in 2004. Health history controls
include limitations to the activities of daily living, limitations to the instrumental activities of daily
living, dummies for whether the individual has been in hospital over night and consulted a doctor
in the 12 months preceding the 2004 interview. Regional characteristics include the proportion of
women, the proportion of people aged 65 or above, dummies for hospital waiting time terciles and
wealth terciles.
34Table 7: Hospital Insurance Take Up and Waiting Time
Education 0.005***
(0.001)
Recall 0.009***
(0.003)
Fluency 0.001
(0.001)
Wait Time II 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Wait Time III 0.004 0.003 0.002
(0.017) (0.016) (0.016)
Education*Wait Time II 0
(0.002)
Education*Wait Time III 0.004
(0.003)
Recall*Wait Time II 0.008
(0.005)
Recall*Wait Time III 0.01
(0.007)
Fluency*Wait Time II 0.001
(0.001)
Fluency*Wait Time III 0.004**
(0.002)
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes
Health History Controls Yes Yes Yes
Regional Characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5874 5873 5859
Note: *** denotes signi￿cance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. Marginal e￿ects from het-
eroskedasticity robust univariate probit are reported. The dependent variable for the univari-
ate probit is the dummy for whether the individual owned a hospital private insurance in 2004.
The marginal e￿ect on the interaction term has been calculated using the method suggested
by Norton et al. (2004). Standard errors are calculated using 500 bootstrap repetitions. Wait
Time II and III are the II and III terciles of regional waiting time calculated as a sample
weighted average of individual responses on the number of months delay before the last out-
patient treatment. Baseline controls include age, sex, marital status, occupational dummies,
household size, household income (in logs) wealth terciles, dummies for whether the individual
takes moderate physical exercise, is obese and is a smoker as recorded in 2004. Health history
controls include limitations to the activities of daily living, limitations to the instrumental
activities of daily living, dummies for whether the individual has been in hospital over night
and consulted a doctor in the 12 months preceding the 2004 interview. Regional characteristics
include the proportion of women, proportion of people aged 65 or over, and wealth terciles.
35Table 8: Private Pension Take Up and Quality of Health Promotion
Education 0.007*** 0.007***
(0.001) (0.001)
Recall 0.006** 0.007**
(0.003) (0.003)
Fluency 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
% Advised Flu Vacc. 0.003 -0.035 0.002 -0.04 -0.003 -0.045
(0.037) (0.038) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038) (0.039)
Education*% Advised Flu Vacc. -0.005 -0.007
(0.005) (0.005)
Recall*% Advised Flu Vacc. -0.017 -0.021
(0.012) (0.012)
Fluency*% Advised Flu Vacc. -0.003 -0.004
(0.003) (0.003)
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Health History Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional Characteristics No Yes No Yes No Yes
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5870 5870 5869 5869 5855 5855
Note: *** denotes signi￿cance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. Marginal e￿ects from het-
eroskedasticity robust univariate probit are reported. The dependent variable is the dummy
for whether the individual had a private pension in 2004. The marginal e￿ect on the interaction
term is calculated using the method suggested by Norton et al. (2004). Standard errors are
calculated using 500 bootstrap repetitions. % Advised Flu Vacc. is the proportion of individu-
als in the region aged 65 or over that were advised by a doctor or a health professional to have
a ￿u vaccination. Baseline controls include age, sex, marital status, occupational dummies,
household size, household income (in logs) wealth terciles, dummies for whether the individual
takes moderate physical exercise, is obese and is a smoker as recorded in 2004. Health history
controls include limitations to the activities of daily living, limitations to the instrumental
activities of daily living, dummies for whether the individual has been in hospital over night
and consulted a doctor in the 12 months preceding the 2004 interview. Regional characteris-
tics include the proportion of women, the proportion of people aged 65 or over, dummies for
hospital waiting times terciles, and wealth terciles.
36Table 9: Hospital Insurance Take Up and Stock Market Participation
Education 0.005*** 0,005***
(0.001) (0.001)
Recall 0.009*** 0,009***
(0.003) (0.003)
Fluency 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
% Stock Market 0.302*** 0,275* 0,298** 0.272 0,295** 0.268
(0.124) (0.161) (0.129) (0.158) (0.136) (0.155)
Education*% Stock Market -0.009 -0.008
(0.014) (0.014)
Recall*% Stock Market -0.004 -0.005
(0.032) (0.032)
Fluency*% Stock Market 0.007 0.005
(0.007) (0.007)
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Health History Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional Characteristics No Yes No Yes No Yes
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5878 5878 5877 5877 5863 5863
Note: *** denotes signi￿cance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. Marginal e￿ects from het-
eroskedasticity robust univariate probit. The dependent variable for the univariate probit is
the dummy for whether the individual had a hospital private insurance in 2004. The marginal
e￿ect on the interaction term is calculated using the method suggested by Norton et al. (2004).
Standard errors are calculated using 500 bootstrap repetitions. % Stock Market is the pro-
portion of individuals in the region aged 50 or over that invest in the stock market. Baseline
controls include age, sex, marital status, occupational dummies, household size, household in-
come (in logs) wealth terciles, dummies for whether the individual takes moderate physical
exercise, is obese and is a smoker as recorded in 2004. Health history controls include limita-
tions to the activities of daily living, limitations to the instrumental activities of daily living,
dummies for whether the individual has been in hospital over night and has consulted a doctor
in the 12 months preceding the 2004 interview. Regional characteristics include the proportion
of women, the proportion of people aged 65 or over, dummies for hospital waiting time terciles
and wealth terciles.
37Table AI: Test for residual private information - Alternative classi￿cation
Full Sample Low Quality High Quality
Countries Countries
Hospital Hospital Hospital Hospital Hospital Hospital
Overnight Insurance Overnight Insurance Overnight Insurance
Survival Probability -0.048*** 0.024 -0.029 0.061*** -0.063*** -0.004
(0.017) (0.017) (0.026) (0.017) (0.022) (0.026)
II Inc. Tercile -0.002 0.032** 0.013 0.011 -0.019 0.038*
(0.012) (0.013) (0.017) (0.011) (0.016) (0.020)
III Inc. Tercile -0.000 0.065*** 0.029 0.050** -0.017 0.060***
(0.014) (0.015) (0.024) (0.020) (0.018) (0.020)
II Wealth Tercile -0.021* 0.043*** -0.005 0.017 -0.029** 0.057***
(0.011) (0.013) (0.016) (0.012) (0.014) (0.020)
III Wealth Tercile -0.013 0.073*** -0.010 0.036** -0.012 0.094***
(0.012) (0.014) (0.018) (0.016) (0.016) (0.020)
Correlation Coe￿. 0.046 0.027 0.049
Bivariate Probit (½)
Likel. Ratio Test (½=0) 1.451 0.075 1.302
Insurers Controls Yes Yes Yes
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5591 5591 1913 1913 3678 3678
Note: *** denotes signi￿cance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. Marginal e￿ects from het-
eroskedasticity robust bivariate probit. Low Quality Healthcare countries include Greece, Italy
and Spain. High Quality Healthcare countries include Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany
and Sweden. The dependent variables for the bivariate probit are a dummy for whether the
individual had a hospital private insurance in 2004 and a dummy that takes value 1 if the indi-
vidual has been in hospital over night in the 12 months preceding the 2006 interview. Individual
characteristics were measured in 2004. Insurers controls include age (in single year dummies),
sex, marital status, age of spouse, occupational dummies, residence in a metropolitan area,
and variables for current and past health status (see text for the complete list).
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39Table AIII: Hospital Insurance Take Up and an alternative measure of Health Promo-
tion
Education 0.005*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001)
Recall 0.009** 0.009***
(0.003) (0.003)
Fluency 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
% Advised Colons. 0.034 0.045 0.042 0.048 0.055 0.06
(0.057) (0.064) (0.060) (0.066) (0.061) (0.063)
Education*% Advised Colons. -0.003 -0.005
(0.011) (0.011)
Recall*% Advised Colons. -0.043** -0.043**
(0.023) (0.022)
Recall*% Advised Colons. -0.012** -0.012**
(0.005) (0.006)
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Health History Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional Characteristics No Yes No Yes No Yes
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5874 5874 5873 5873 5859 5859
Note: *** denotes signi￿cance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. Marginal e￿ects from univariate
probit. The dependent variable for the univariate probit is the dummy for whether the individual
owned a private hospital insurance in 2004. The marginal e￿ect on the interaction term is calcu-
lated using the method suggested by Norton et al. (2004). Standard errors are calculated using
500 bootstrap repetitions. % Advised Colons. is the proportion of individuals in the region aged
50-85 that have been advised by a doctor to have a colonoscopy. Baseline controls include age, sex,
marital status, occupational dummies, household size, household income (in logs) wealth terciles,
dummies for whether the individual takes moderate physical exercise, is obese and is a smoker
as recorded in 2004. Health history controls include limitations to the activities of daily living,
limitations to the instrumental activities of daily living, dummies for whether the individual has
been in hospital overnight and consulted a doctor in the 12 months preceding the 2004 interview.
Regional characteristics include the proportion of women, the proportion of people aged 65 or
over, dummies for hospital waiting time terciles and wealth terciles.
40